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has shown that “the more close the ties between the coun-
tries, the more alive is the cooperation”.59 Hopefully, the
OECD Member countries are sufficiently connected with
each other to ensure the success of the OECD Agreement.
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1. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE MUTUAL
AGREEMENT PROCEDURE
Notwithstanding the wide recognition of the mutual agree-
ment procedure – envisaged in Art. 25(3) of the OECD
Model Tax Convention1 (OECD Model) – as an efficient
and flexible instrument in the interpretation, application
and development of tax treaties,2 this mechanism has been
extensively criticized in international tax legal scholar-
ship.
The main inconveniences of the mutual agreement proce-
dure, pointed out both by the commentators3 and the inter-
national organizations,4 in particular by the International
Fiscal Association5 (IFA), can be summarized as follows:
– the competent authorities have no obligation to reach
an agreement but only to communicate with each other
and negotiate in order to clarify the interpretative dis-
pute. In other words, even though the purpose of the
provision is to reach an agreement, a solution to the
conflict is not guaranteed because the states are merely
required to exercise their best efforts;6
– there are no time limits within which a solution is
required to be found. This results in delays in the pro-
cedure, another important deficiency7 of this mecha-
nism.
In fact, the settlement of the case may take several
years because of differences in language, procedures
and legal and accounting systems, as well the inability
of the tax authorities to come to an agreement;8
– concerning the publication of the agreement, the crite-
ria adopted are not homogeneous, which is obviously
unsatisfactory; thus it depends on the discretion of
each state whether the interpretative mutual agree-
ments are eventually published. Considering that the
first sentence of Art. 25(3) of the OECD Model, in
contrast to the narrower procedure established in Art.
25(1), grants the power to seek a solution that has
precedential value, i.e. that is not just binding in the
specific case, the lack of uniformity in the publication
of the agreement represents an even greater disadvan-
tage of the “consultation procedure”;
– the mechanism of the mutual agreement procedure
does not oblige revenue authorities to implement the
solution (if one is reached). On the contrary, more
often than not the implementation of the agreement
depends upon the domestic laws of the contracting
parties, which leads consequently to divergent results
in each state;
– to make matters worse, some countries tend to adopt a
neutral attitude towards the mutual agreement proce-
dure, i.e. they do not demonstrate any interest in using
this dispute resolution mechanism, maybe because of
the aforementioned deficiencies.
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Taking the insufficiencies of the mutual agreement proce-
dure as a starting point, this article attempts to provide a
feasible solution in the form of mandatory arbitration that
would be triggered once the consultation procedure has
failed. This would be achieved by adding an incentive for
the competent authorities to resolve the controversial
interpretation under the procédure amiable.
The fact that the wording of Art. 25(3) of the UN Model
and Art. 25(3) of the US Model (which additionally in-
cludes an inexhaustive list of factual questions on which
the revenue authorities are authorized to consult and reach
an agreement on) are identical to each other but differ from
the wording of the same provision in the OECD Model9
emphasizes the difficulty in finding an appropriate solu-
tion.
Neither the Nordic Convention of 1996 nor the Andean
Group Model Tax Treaty set out an alternative or comple-
mentary measure to supersede the impediments of the tra-
ditional mutual agreement procedure.
As stated above, this issue has been the subject of exten-
sive discussion in the literature. The conclusion is that the
main reason for difficulty resides in the reluctance of the
contracting states to transfer their power to decide upon
the terms of a settlement to a body beyond their control,
because of the diminution of their fiscal sovereignty that
this would imply. In this respect the OECD Committee on
Fiscal Affairs also noted that Art. 25 represents the max-
imum that Member countries are prepared to accept, given
that this provision is not yet entirely satisfactory.10
2. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE CURRENT SYSTEM
In general, international law contemplates three methods
to resolve international disputes: negotiation between the
states concerned, a decision rendered by an international
court and international arbitration.11
Before addressing other specific issues, the possibility of
improving the existing dispute resolution method should
first be considered, which responds to and clearly fulfils a
need, particularly in the area of allocation of income and
expenses.
In the author’s view what is initially needed is a substan-
tial improvement of the effectiveness of the mutual agree-
ment procedure. Much more information is required on the
mechanism itself. Further, a real interest of the contracting
states in negotiating in order to resolve interpretation con-
flicts needs to be fostered. In addition, as tax treaty experi-
ence shows, the procedure can be protracted and the result
uncertain. Thus, competent authorities should make every
effort to resolve the cases in less time than it currently
takes. Needless to say, it is necessary to eliminate the
uncertainty of the result by compelling the parties to reach
an effective agreement. Furthermore, there is a need to
publish the outcome derived from such a procedure, pro-
vided it is of general interest to taxpayers. It is also essen-
tial agreements be implemented regardless of domestic
constraints, as implementation is an essential condition for
the development of international tax law.12
Apart from the call for reforms within the confines of the
classic “consultation procedure”, there have been repeated
calls for the creation of an independent arbitral or judicial
court and for the establishment of an advisory body for the
settlement of tax disputes.
Certain academics13 have proposed the creation of a supra-
national body that competent authorities can request opin-
ions from on the interpretation of a given treaty provision
relevant to the case under consideration. In the author’s
view, however, both the optional nature of this initiative
and the non-binding character of the opinion issued by this
body on contracting states, makes such an advisory mech-
anism insufficient in order to secure an effective solution
to the interpretative problem. In particular, the main disad-
vantage of this proposal is the discretion afforded to the
tax authorities, who – as under the mutual agreement pro-
cedure – are under no duty to resolve the conflicts that
could eventually arise in interpreting and applying tax
treaties.
On the other hand, the establishment of an international
judicial or arbitral mechanism, demanded in the past by
the League of Nations as early as in 1920, has again
become an attractive idea that is supported currently in the
literature.14 Different groups of scholars in favour of this
thesis can be distinguished depending on whether they
argue for the creation of an international tax court ex novo,
or for an existing judicial court to play a role in the settle-
ment of international tax disputes.
In this respect, even though the plea for a “world tax
court” has been reiterated by the IFA,15 the International
Bar Association and the International Chamber of Com-
merce, among other relevant organizations, and even
though there is renewed interest in the legal scholarship, it
must be assumed that being the suitable solution in this
area, it is also the most difficult one to reach.16 As Azzi
declared, the establishment of “an International Tax Court
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with power to settle international tax disputes would not
only lead to the creation of a centralized database of prece-
dents but would also inject uniformity and certainty”17 into
this field.
Although this author emphasized the fact that “it is not
intended that the proposed International Tax Court usurp
the underlying taxing rights of countries but that it merely
facilitate the objective and efficient resolution of treaty-
related disputes and oversee enforcement of international
treaty rulings”,18 it cannot be expected that such an inter-
national body with these characteristics will be estab-
lished, at least at present, taking into consideration the
contracting state’s hesitation to give up part or all of their
fiscal sovereignty to a third party and agree, in advance, to
abide by the judicial decision.
Based on this reason and the complications that are
involved in the creation of such a judicial body, another
branch of legal scholarship has approached the problem by
focussing on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) as institutions that can
play a role in international fiscal dispute resolution. Nev-
ertheless, recourse to such recognized judicial bodies can
also pose significant problems that should not be lost sight
of, and which are only briefly outlined in this article.19
Considering that the ICJ deals with the broadest scope of
questions arising under international law, some practition-
ers recommend that cases on tax treaty interpretation
should be referred to this institution.20 However, the fact
that the jurisdiction of the court must be established by
way of a compromise between the parties, that its infras-
tructure is not suited to a large number of cases and, more-
over, that it is merely an ad hoc court, whose judges are not
international tax experts, explains why not a single known
tax treaty interpretation case has been referred to it.
Insofar as the ECJ is concerned, the main objection is that
it is merely entitled to act within the territorial scope of the
European Union, and therefore would only provide a rem-
edy in the sphere of tax treaties concluded between EU
Member States. In any event, the inclusion in the new
Austria–Germany tax treaty of a reference to the ECJ for
settlement of disputes as an arbitral body, provided that the
interpretation conflict cannot be resolved within three
years through the amicable procedure,21 undoubtedly rep-
resents an innovation that could perhaps lead to good
results in the future.
On the whole, the previous reflections bring one back to
the arbitration procedure as a more useful mechanism for
the resolution of disputes involving tax authorities.
Although, as stated above, most contracting states still
consider the adoption of such a method an unacceptable
surrender of their sovereign rights,22 it can be an appropri-
ate means of resolving international tax conflicts, as evi-
denced not only by the tax specialists23 but also by the tax
treaty practice.24 The growing number of tax treaties cur-
rently including arbitration clauses represents, indeed, a
step forward in superseding the defects of the “consulta-
tion procedure”.
Without going further into this issue, it can be said that the
most characteristic feature of the standard arbitration
clause embodied today in an increasing number of tax
treaties – the origin of which dates as far back as the bilat-
eral conventions between the United States and Ger-
many,25 Mexico and the Netherlands, signed in the early
1990s – is its optional nature.
The proposal to focus on arbitration is encouraging and
arbitration is in fact being defended and illustrated at pre-
sent by prominent authors26 as an adequate tool in this
sphere, however, its non-mandatory character is unsatis-
factory. As it is worded, the arbitration clause attributes an
absolute discretion to the competent authorities both in
respect of submitting the dispute to the arbitrators and
abiding by the arbitration award.
In summary, what is remarkable is the fact that although
the appropriateness of the arbitration method is not ques-
tioned, this mechanism does not ensure that disputes on
the contents of a tax treaty can be resolved in all situations.
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3. A MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSE TO
COMPLEMENT THE MUTUAL AGREEMENT
PROCEDURE
Using the OECD Model article as a basis for discussion, it
is evident that the mutual agreement procedure does not
always lead to a satisfactory solution. Thus it is reasonable
to conclude that a logical extension must be found.
In the absence of support for instituting an International
Tax Court as the optimal solution and taking into account
that an arbitration procedure that is dependent on the con-
sent of the competent authorities is not sufficient, the
author argues for a system of internationally binding arbi-
tration to supplement the existing “consultation proce-
dure”.27 It should be borne in mind, however, that manda-
tory arbitration would be applied not to resolve all cases of
double or excessive taxation but only to controversies
regarding the interpretation or application of the treaty.
Moreover, the compulsory arbitration proposed should be
structured to complement the mutual agreement proce-
dure, since a matter may only be submitted to arbitration
after exhausting the mutual agreement procedure and pro-
vided the tax authorities and the taxpayer have previously
agreed to invoke arbitration in these circumstances and be
bound by the final award.
As a permanent international arbitral body does not con-
stitute a viable option for the moment,28 supranational
boards should instead be set up on a case-by-case basis.
Thus, the arbitration commission would only be consti-
tuted for the particular conflict. In contrast to the existing
dispute resolution method, which unfortunately does not
provide a time frame for the competent authorities to reach
agreement, the author proposes that arbitration would be
resorted to after a year has elapsed without a solution
through the mutual agreement procedure.
In order for a compulsory arbitration system to be realized,
Art. 25(3) OECD Model should be amended to include an
obligation for contracting states to submit the issue to the
tax arbitrators if they are unable to agree in a more amica-
ble manner. The model clause suggested might read as fol-
lows: “The competent authorities of the Contracting States
shall endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any diffi-
culties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or applica-
tion of the Convention. If no settlement can be reached by
the Contracting States within one year, the case must be
submitted to an ad hoc arbitration commission, consisting
of three members appointed in advance from a selected list
of international tax experts, which must render its decision
within six months. The arbitration award is binding on
both States and the taxpayer(s) involved in the case, pro-
vided the competent authorities and the taxpayer have
agreed in writing to be bound by the decision of the arbi-
tration board. Likewise, the Contracting States may also
consult together in order to eliminate double taxation in
cases not provided for in the Convention”.
As regards the detailed rules governing the arbitration pro-
cedure, these would only come into effect once the parties
have so agreed through an exchange of diplomatic notes.
In the author’s view, it would be desirable to apply the
existing procedural rules contained in recent tax treaties,29
subject to minor modifications. In particular, the arbitra-
tion board should be composed of three impartial mem-
bers. Each tax authority will appoint one arbitrator from a
limited list of international tax specialists30 previously
nominated by the contracting states. These members will
jointly elect one additional person to act as a chairperson.31
Once installed, the arbitration board will decide the spe-
cific case on the basis of the tax treaty, giving due consid-
eration to the domestic laws of the parties and the princi-
ples of international law. The tax arbitrators will provide
to the competent authorities an explanation of their deci-
sion, which is binding on both the contracting states and
the taxpayer with respect to that case. In this respect, no
appeal will be possible on substantive issues.
Accordingly, the major difference between this proposal
and the procedure designed by the EC Arbitration Con-
vention32 of 1990, is the fact that under the latter the com-
petent authorities may make a decision that departs from
the Arbitration Committee’s opinion,33 provided agree-
ment that eliminates double taxation is reached within a
time limit of six months after the former advisory opinion
is rendered.34 In the author’s view, in contrast to the EC
Arbitration Convention, the pure compulsory arbitration
recommended here has two advantages. First, it provides
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an incentive for the contracting states to resolve the issue
quickly through the mutual agreement procedure. Sec-
ondly, there is no possibility for the parties to enter into
further consultations for an additional period of six
months, which will unnecessarily delay the outcome.
One of the important aims of compulsory arbitration is to
foster uniformity in the interpretation of identical treaty
provisions. For that purpose the arbitrator’s award should
be published in an English standard format. Even though
the decision will not be precedential, it could be used in
subsequent similar cases where appropriate. Furthermore,
the costs of the arbitration procedure will be borne in the
following manner: each contracting state will bear the
costs of the member appointed by it, as well as for its rep-
resentation in the proceedings before the arbitration tri-
bunal. All other costs will be shared equally between the
contracting states.
In conclusion, although the international tax community
has witnessed few arbitration cases so far, the recent inclu-
sion of voluntary arbitration clauses in tax treaties repre-
sents a considerable trend, and consequently a reason to be
optimistic that there will be further action in this field. It is
therefore hoped that the experience obtained under this
system will convince the sovereign states that they have
nothing to fear and much to gain from compulsory arbitra-
tion as a subsidiary mechanism to guarantee the resolution
of tax treaty interpretation divergences once the mutual
agreement procedure has proven unsuccessful.
